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Summary 
In Sub Sahara Africa, there is evidence that households with access to small scale irrigation 
are significantly less poor than households without access to irrigation. But private motopump 
tend to be unequally distributed. This paper investigates the success of explicit pro-poor 
intervention with emphasis on small-scale irrigation in the semi-arid Limpopo Basin in 
Mozambique. It highlights that the high irrigation cost are progressively excluding the poorest 
who do not have the mean to derive from other activities the cash to fund for irrigation 
functioning. Besides the functioning of collective scheme where they had been included is 
jeopardized by the development of private irrigation supported by hidden subsidies which are 
being appropriated by local elite. This unequal mode of access to irrigation can contribute to 
stir resentments at community level, weakening community cohesiveness and consequently its 
margin for collective action and coordination capacity which are crucial for collective 
irrigation.   
Highlights 
 Small scale irrigation has recently been increasing due to drought relief interventions 
or funding from local development fund which in practice is subsidizing private 
irrigation. 
 Poorest families tend to drop-off from collective irrigation while they have no access 
to local development fund due to the bias of the allocation mechanism 
 The fragile land tenure arrangements of collective irrigation are jeopardized by the 
development of private irrigation 
 A proper analysis of the economic profitability of small scale irrigation is needed 
 
1. Introduction 
With the adoption of the strategic plan for the reduction of absolute poverty (PARPA I) and 
its sequels, the Government of Mozambique has put officially poverty alleviation in the center 
2 
 
of its preoccupation. In the semi-arid part of Mozambique small scale irrigation (SSI) is being 
promoted either as a poverty alleviation or food security mechanism. This is notably the case 
in the Mozambican upper part of the Limpopo Basin where SSI has been expanding rapidly in 
the last decade. SSI refers here to irrigation scheme of less than 50 ha with the use of low cost 
technologies such as small motopump to lift water.     
Initially promoted to counter the failure of large scale irrigation, SSI has largely spread in 
Africa thanks to the development of cheap motopumps (Fraiture and Giordano, 2014; 
Kimmage, 1991). Irrigation contributes to poverty alleviation through different direct or 
indirect mechanisms such as higher food production and income, higher and stabilized labor 
demand, increase of agricultural productivity and decrease in food price (Hanjra et al., 2009). 
SSI is often considered as pro-poor by essence by permitting a fairer development and 
management of the scheme (World Bank, 2006) and at micro-level different studies have 
underlined that farm households with access to SSI were significantly less poor than 
households without access to irrigation (Bacha et al., 2011; Dillon:, 2011). But the 
distribution of private ownership equipment tends to be unequal. For example in Ghana pump 
owner tend to be the better offs male farmers (Namara et al., 2013). Thus the question is 
whether explicit pro-poor oriented interventions with focus on SSI contribute to correct 
unequal access to irrigation.   
This paper investigates the success of SSI program in addressing poverty at community level 
in the context of Mozambique. It argues that the very high cost of irrigation are progressively 
excluding the poorest who do not have the mean to derive cash to fund fuel cost from other 
activities. Beside collective scheme functioning are jeopardizing by the development of 
private irrigation supported by the hidden subsidies of the local develop fund which is being 
appropriated by local elite. It also can contribute to stir resentments at community level which 
can weaken community cohesiveness and its margin for collective action.    
2. Context 
This study was developed in the district of Mabalane located in the upper part of the 
Mozambican Limpopo basin. This little populated and mostly agro-pastoral district enjoys a 
semi-arid climate with a total rain amount varying between 361 and 470 mm a year (INGC et 
al., 2003). The rains mostly occur between October and March. As part of the most risk prone 
areas of Mozambique Mabalane district faced two major floods (February 2000 and January 
2013) and one major drought (2004/2007) and in the last 15 years. There are indications both 
in data and perceptions that the region is already impacted by climate change including 
delayed onset of rain and an increase of the rain falling in heavy events. (Parkinson, 2013; 
Ribeiro and Chaúque, s.d; Sacramento et al.)   
Two third of the communities and population are located on the riverine area along the 
Limpopo river. The left side of the Limpopo River is part of the buffer zone of the Limpopo 
National Park (LNP). This area has no direct road access to the district center except when the 
river dries up. The district had no tarred road but is on the train line connecting the Zimbabwe 
border to Chókwè the informal Northern Gaza capital and the main market of the region, 
located one hundred kilometer away.  
With 72 % of its population below poverty line Mabalane is part of the 4th quartile of the 
poorest districts of Mozambique according to official ranking based on nutrition, food 
security and access to public good indicators. Livelihood relies on agriculture (maize, 
groundnut, and cowpeas), animal breading (poultry, pigs, small ruminants and cattle), small 
trade, migration remittance and increasingly charcoal production. Traditionally agriculture is 
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being practiced in two main areas with different soil types: sandy plot of the higher ground 
and the fertile foamy soil of the alluvial terraces. The rain fed crop season extend during the 
wet hot season.  Rain-fed agricultural productivity is low with average yield of maize between 
0,5 and 0,7 t/ha. Approximately one third of the 5400 families is not food sufficient and 
suffers from a hungry gap period varying between 3 and 5 months following years and zone 
(FEWSNET, 2012).  
The river dries up approximately three months a year (between September and December) due 
to upstream uptake and basin management. There is no access to superficial water away from 
the Limpopo River as all other water bodies in this area follow an ephemeral regime which 
only allows for filling a few small reservoirs, non-of them being permanent. Groundwater 
uses for irrigation is restricted by its depth and salinity risk (FAO, 2004). Thus irrigation is 
only possible along the Limpopo River. 
There used to be two middle size irrigation scheme (600 ha in total) producing rice in 
Mabalane but the infrastructures had been destroyed during the civil war and they are no 
longer operating. Since the return of the population to their villages, the development of SSI 
has been permitted by two types of external initiatives (i) Drought relief and/or food security 
interventions promoted by the government through the National Institute of Social Action 
(INAS) or by NGOs and  (ii) individual or collective projects funded by the newly created 
Local Development Fund (LDF). INAS is in charge of the development of social security 
programs and activities in relation with absolute poverty alleviation: although its intervention 
mode has recently evolved, it has in the past supported SSI either by rehabilitating small 
reservoirs through food-for-work scheme and/or funding small irrigation schemes. The LDF - 
also called Investment Budget for Local Initiative (Orçamento de Investimento de Iniciativa 
Local (OIIL) - was introduced in 2006. It aims to reduce poverty by funding projects of food 
production and income or jobs generation by offering a credit opportunity to people excluded 
from the formal credit system. The interest rate is 5 % but there is no strict rule for 
reimbursement. The fund is being allocated by the Local Consultative Councils (LCCs – 
Conselhos Consultativos Locais). Institutionalized in 2005 the LCCs gather coopted members 
from the local state administration, the organized civil society as well as village and local 
economic elites. LCCs are principally involved in the approbation of the district plans and 
their implementation. There is one LCC at each administrative level (District, Administrative 
Post and Locality). In Mabalane these councils are fully functioning, gathering at least twice a 
year at least and elaborating sessions minutes.   
3. Methodology 
This investigation did not study small-scale irrigation as such but the interaction between 
small scale irrigation and poverty alleviation schemes. We followed a three step approach. 
The institutional frameworks of the different interventions were first characterized by 
literature review and key-actors interview at national and provincial level. Then local 
implementation was investigated using a public policy analysis (PPA) approach, in order to 
characterize and analyze the gap between the level of official declarations and the reality as it 
appears in actors’ practices. PPA allows for describing the “state at work” or the “politics 
from below” and focuses on various governance levels. It emphasizes the necessity of 
considering the broader context both historically but also horizontally (interactions across 
policy sectors) and vertically (multi-level interactions). It thus analyzes the different formal 
and informal institutional and policy arrangements around which both public and non-public 
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actors interacted in the implementation of the program as well as some unexpected 
interactions between several policy sectors.   
In this aim, different members of the district government and administration were interviewed 
(administrator, district permanent secretary, administrative post and some locality post chiefs) 
as well as the head of district services (notably agriculture and social services but also from 
the water and planning district services) and some technicians. Water use, access and 
management were then explored in twelve communities between November and December 
2012. This village level survey included:  (i) an interviews of leaders (ii) focus groups with 
water and irrigation committee members (iii) focus group with women (2 villages only) (iv) 
Transect walk and visit of village water infrastructure and irrigated scheme accompanied by 
member(s) of the related committee (v) Private motopump owners were also interviewed 
when present. In total five private irrigators and seven irrigation associations (two of them 
non-functioning) were investigated.   
In three riverine villages a quantitative survey (119 interviews in total) was carried out to 
analyze water uses and access to pro-poor interventions. The three villages were selected to 
have various sources of drinking water, have irrigation scheme(s), a comparable number of 
households and be located in different area along the river (Table 1). There were 
discrepancies between the district documents used to select villages and the effective number 
of households or irrigations systems:  the third village located in the LNP buffer zone had a 
significantly lower number of households than official numbers indicated.  
In each village, the leaders were asked to group each households in four wealth groups 
(Poorest, Poor, Middle and Better-Off) according to their own perception. Twenty percent of 
the households in each package were them randomly selected and interviewed.   
TABLE 1: SOME INFORMATION CONCERNING THE THREE VILLAGES STUDIED 
 Village 1 Village 2 Village 3 
Households 
number 
175 (360 on paper) 334 (492 in paper) 69 (226 on paper) 
Interviews 
number 
36 67 16 
Water 
sources 
River and 3 boreholes  
(1 old, 2 new) 
River, 1 lagoon, 1 
reservoir, 4 boreholes (1 
new, 1 nonfunctioning) 
River (20 mn walking), 2 
borehole (1 new) 
Infrastructure 
Health center, Movitel aerial, 
small solar system 
INAS intervention (older people) 
School building in medium state 
New health center 
School building in bad 
state 
Extremely precarious “school” 
(traditional material) 
NGOs project 
support 
One research-action project 
focusing on small animal 
breeding (2008-2010) 
Long term intervention of 
one NGO which is no 
longer intervening (tank 
cistern, irrigation, 
conservation agriculture 
etc) 
No intervention 
Associations 
Goat breeder association 
Charcoal making association 
(non- functioning) 
 
1 irrigation association (non –
functionning) 
Irrigation 
There used to be an irrigation 
association no longer 
functioning 
3 private farmers with moto-
pumps 
One irrigation association 
4 privates farmers with 
moto-pumps 
One irrigation association after 
independence using the 
equipment left by a 
Portuguese colon but was lost 
during civil war 
The village created  an 
association and received a 
motopump through FDD 
project but it was not 
implemented for lack of skills 
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In this sample, 71 % households were headed by men (Table 3) but 54 % of the interviewees 
were women. Thirty-two percent of the households had at least one member away (in 
migration for example). Fifty one percent reported having at least one member with chronic 
disease1 and 32 % at least one member above 65 years. In average households held 8,9 
persons with 3,7 children under the age of 15. Village 3 had slightly younger households with 
consequently smaller family (Table 2). The group “Poor” represented 42 % of all 
interviewees of our survey and the group “Poorest” 21 %. 
 
TABLE 2: DESCRIPTION OF THE SAMPLE  
 Village 1 Village 2 Village 3 
Total 
sample 
Age of head of households 50,2 (13,5) 49,2 (14,3) 44,1 (12,7) 48,8 (13,9) 
Total family size 8,5 (4,0) 9,3 (5,2) 7,9 (3,5) 8,9 (4,7) 
Children less than 15 years old (yo) 3,7 (2,4) 3,7 (3,3) 4,1 (2,9) 3,7 (3,0) 
% household reporting people with chronic disease 44 % 57 % 44 % 51 % 
Nb of people above 65  0,4 (0,8) 0,5 (0,8) 0,2 (0,4) 0,4 (0,7) 
% household reporting people above  65  31 % 36 % 19 % 32 % 
Head of household is a women 27,8 % 32,8 % 18,7 % 29,4 % 
interviewee is women 63,9 % 43,3 % 75,0 % 53,8 % 
% household  reporting member in migration 33,3 % 29,8 % 37,5 % 31,9 % 
Average (standard deviation) 
 
The questionnaire included a card exercise aiming at characterizing perception concerning 
equity and priority interventions at village level : Interviewees were asked to select and justify 
their choice concerning three preferred development options and three least preferred options 
in a set of eighteen options presented on cards (Box 1). The different options proposed had 
been or were on the verge to be experimented by different programs/projects in the area. 
Three options dealt with irrigation. 
 
BOX 1 : THE DIFFERENT OPTIONS PROPOSED IN THE CARD PREFERENCE EXERCISE  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 With a strong likelihood to be AIDS related 
A A new borehole even with saline water , monthly payment following on-going tariff 
B A new borehole only if water is not saline, monthly payment following on-going basis 
C A small water system with good (non-saline) water payment on container basis (50 ctv/container) 
D Rehabilitation or building of a reservoir 
E Demonstration of cistern in 5 families 
F Upgrading of  the school 
G Motorized maize mill / grinder 
H Subsidy for irrigation (1 moto-pump and 1 year input) to an association (40 families cultivating 5 ha) 
I Subsidy for irrigation (1 moto-pump and 1 year inputs) to 1 farmer for 15 ha  - commits to engage 5 villagers 
J Subsidy for irrigation (1 moto-pump and 1 year inputs) for farmer for 20 ha – partnership with 9 other farmers  
K Subsidy in the form of 20 goats for 20 families on a rotating scheme: off-springs are given to other families 
L Subsidy in the form of 7 cows for 7 families on a rotating scheme   
M Subsidy in the form of one pair of oxen and plough to one family  
N Food for work program allowing to engage 30 families 
O Monthly subsidy 5 vulnerable families or old people : 50 MT/monthly  
P Subsidy to 100 families  in the form of vouchers to buy input in agricultural fair 
Q Demonstration of innovation agricultural techniques developed in the plot of 1 farmers (but attended by village)  
R Demonstration of  improved pit latrine in 2 families 
S Authorization of making charcoal making on a quota system  (Village 3 only) 
T Authorization of making charcoal with no conditions attached (Village 3 only)  
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4. Results 
4.1. Small-scale irrigation in Mabalane District  
4.1.1. SSI extension is uncertain 
There is very limited information on irrigation in the Northern Gaza region. The (District 
Service for Agriculture and Economic activities – SDAE- is supposed to provide the 
agriculture statistics but the reliability of their data is questioned even by LCC meeting 
minutes. There is no other information source as water users registration is not compulsory 
along the non-regulated water bodies of the Limpopo Basin (Alba et al., 2014).  
According to the SDAE agricultural campaign report for 2011/2012 the district officially 
counted 82 motopumps, 25 irrigation schemes, 19 irrigation associations and 19 private 
irrigators.  The district also reports an increase by 60 % of the number of irrigation schemes in 
one year. This is much higher than the number provided by technicians (table 3) which 
partially differentiates between operational and non-operational schemes. Indeed field visit 
underlined that many privately or collectively owned motopumps were not operational and 
when operational were not systematically used.  
 
TABLE 3 : IRRIGATION SYSTEM BY ADMINISTRATIVE POST (2011/2012 CAMPAIGN)  
 Private moto-pumps Collective system/moto-pumps 
Combumune 6 3 
Ntlavene 25 
6 + 1 construction 
2 non operational 
Mabalane-Sede 15 9 
TOTAL 46 19 
(source: technicians interviews. Mabalane data do not refers to operational motopump) 
 
All associations of more than 2 years had between 8 to 4 farmers irrigating while initial 
number was above 20 members.  
There was no information referring to manual irrigation but small garden can be found along 
the Limpopo River in nearly all villages and in the rain-fed area around some reservoirs in the 
Plateau areas. Neither was there information on the cumulated irrigated surface at district 
level. Most of the scheme visited were small (4/8 ha) and two of the private irrigators met 
reported irrigating around 15 ha.  
The schemes visited were precarious. Only one of them had some concrete channel (one 
canal). As all plots by the riverside, the schemes were generally fenced to avoid cattle 
incursion. In many case, irrigation timing depended of the availability of fuel which was all 
the more expansive than until September 2013 the closest fuel station was in Chókwè which 
mean a fuel price between 25 to 50 % higher than normal   
4.1.2. Moto pump ownership is not necessarily associated with irrigation 
Four reasons were mentioned to explain motopump underuse: (i) equipment maintenance (ii) 
the high irrigation costs (iii) use of irrigation as a coping mechanism in case of drought, (iv) 
animal incursion (cattle and/or elephants) risks.  
Maintenance of equipment is often considered as a key limiting factor and many studies 
underline the challenges to maintain infrastructure in private or collective small scale 
irrigation (Colenbrander and van Koppen, 2012; Giordano and Fraiture, 2014). In the villages 
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visited, non-operational motopumps were mostly old ones (some dating from the pre-
independence period). Few farmers referred to maintenance issues for new equipment except 
in one case when the motopump was undersized compared to the area irrigated. At association 
level, members complained more from water shortage due to fuel shortage than breakdowns 
of the motopump, although the latter could generate longer delay in irrigation timing. This 
could be explained by the existence of well know mechanics operating in the area and 
availability of most spares in Chókwè which possesses large irrigated areas.  
Some private farmers reported irrigating only in bad years to compensate for low rain-fed 
production. In the local context of labor shortage, high irrigation cost, limited productivity 
and confined market this is probably a rational strategy. There has been no systematic 
economic assessment of irrigation in the area and there are very little data available on the 
economic and technical performance of SSI or its effective contribution for food security at 
village or household level at individual or collective level.  The only data available comes 
from an economic survey initiated by the PNL project which is summarized in the following 
table. 
  
 TABLE 4: SOME ECONOMIC RESULT OF SMALL IRRIGATION SCHEME SUPPORTED BY PNL 
 Non irrigated Maize Irrigated Maize Irrigated bean 
Gross margin (MT/ha) 550 2 350 73 310 
Work day payment (MT/Ha/jour) 22,4 18,8 505,0 
Cash need (MT/ha) 250 4 770 10 550 
Source: CPWF IWEGA - adapted from PNL data, kindly provided by Mr T Meque, PNL. No reference to the number of plot 
monitored or irrigation season. Data collected in isolated LNP buffer zone villages where inputs price are probably higher 
than in other area of the district.  
 
This table underlines that if irrigated crop could be more profitable than non-irrigated ones, 
the need for cash was also very high, especially in the villages of the left margin. A more 
systematic economic analysis is necessary to explore the profitability and efficiency of 
irrigation in the area.  
Animal incursions are a real threat in the area as underlined by the many complaints reported 
in the LCC minutes. Irrigation productions are particularly at risk: after July the remaining 
water pools tend to be sparse outside from the riverbed. Cattle or elephants herds tend then to 
concentrate close to the river – consequently close to the irrigation areas. In 2013, an 
elephant-proof fence isolating the LNP buffer zone from the core part of the park was 
finalized which could however minimize the problem in future. But conflicts with cattle will 
remain an issue as it has a strong cultural value and one of the main placements for money.  
4.1.3. SSI involves different types of governance model  
Our survey identified four main models of governance of small irrigation system using 
motorized equipment (Table 6). A fifth one, based on partnership between commercial 
farming and an association of small farmer was reported in the neighboring Massingir district 
but has not been investigated (Praagman com pers). 
Association has a connoted meaning in the Gaza province. It designs a collective scheme 
where part of the land (a plot) is allocated to the association as a group and the rest divided 
between members with individual management. The association plot is meant to be cultivated 
collectively and its outcomes to be used for a collective purpose for example paying for the 
scheme functioning. There is consequently no water fee but members can be requested to pay 
a supplementary quota to buy fuel and spares if necessary. The irrigation committee generally 
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includes a president, a secretary in charge of monitoring expenses and incomes of the 
association and a production chief in charge of the management of the motopump. He is 
generally the only one authorized to deal with the motopump.  
Partnership is a more traditional governance system, where various farmers aggregate around 
equipment and land, which remains privately owned. Each member is given the right by the 
owner of the land and infrastructure to cultivate under certain condition which generally refers 
to participation in irrigation costs and sometimes labor. This model has been described by 
Manjate and Magaia (2010). Partnership does not involve a collective plot and the repartition 
of land and cost can be unequal between owner and members. Solidarity mechanisms 
targeting irrigation during drought follows this governance model.  
 
TABLE 5: THE FOUR GOVERNANCE SMALL IRRIGATION MODEL IN MABALANE 
NAME The “irrigation heir” The “new comer “ “Association” 
The partners in 
irrigation 
Ownership of 
equipment 
Individual Individual Collective Individual 
Development 
pathway 
The family has been 
involved in irrigation for 
a long time and the 
owner has developed 
technical and 
managerial skills 
Uses existing 
opportunity to start 
irrigation (FDD, 
appropriation of unused 
association moto-pump) 
Developed with external 
support (NGO, PNL) – 
although local initiative 
through FDD can be 
found 
To be assessed 
Land tenure 
Stable: Family access to 
suitable areas (close to 
remaining pools) 
Has normally family 
access to suitable area 
but the area might have 
been let to other 
people/association and 
might need to be 
renegotiated 
Suitable area had to be 
negotiated with 
community; unstable 
tenure right. 
One area of the scheme 
is collective (association 
plot) other area divided 
in individual area 
The owner provides the 
plot and owns the moto-
pump 
Workforce 
Family + hired 
permanent external 
workers (2/4) 
Family based: 
occasional workers 
Family only 
The owner creates 
partnership with other 
families of the 
community of his 
choice. They divide the 
plot, cost and work on 
an unequal basis 
Production 
Horticulture market 
oriented 
Horticulture market 
oriented + subsistence 
Subsistence farming + 
market of surplus 
To be assessed 
Outcomes 
Quite successful 
especially if owns his 
own motorized 
transportation which 
allows him to access 
distant market 
In a learning curve and 
still struggling for 
economic sustainability 
Struggling with a 
diminution of 
membership around 
time (from 10/30 
member to 4/6 
irrigators). Operational 
functioning is only 
possible by other 
resources. 
To be assessed 
 
Technicians are ambiguous on the role and potentialities of small scale irrigation: While they 
often presented it as food security mechanisms they tended to focus their attention to the most 
successful private small irrigators. They tended to underestimate the skills and resources 
mobilized that allow for the (fragile) economic success of this well-connected and 
experienced farmers. They entertained a false representation of irrigation limited to its 
technical dimension at the most, rarely including its economic one and never the social and 
political dimension of collective irrigation. Project supports focused on technical aspects 
(building and technical functioning of irrigation) sometimes including managerial dimensions 
such cost monitoring and water fee collect and management but never coordination issues.  
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Market opportunities and competition between cropping systems varies strongly between 
seasons and trade-offs has to be made between income generating activity, production of 
supplementary food or coping strategy. While traditionally two cropping seasons (rainy wet 
hot season  between October to march) and the cold dry season (April to September) are 
generally considered for irrigation, the changing pattern of rain is opening space for a third 
season (table 13).  
 
TABLE 6: TRADE-OFF BETWEEN WATER, MARKET AND LABOR FOR IRRIGATION IN MABALANE 
 
Rainy (wet hot) 
(Nov to march) 
Dry Cold 
(march to 
July/August) 
Hot dry season 
(July – October/November) 
Water 
Low irrigation cost except 
during drought year 
Easy access to water 
Medium irrigation cost 
Medium access to 
water 
Very high irrigation cost 
Limited access to water 
Market 
High market price 
Locally high to moderate  
demand for staple food 
Low market price 
Locally limited demand 
for staple food 
moderate to high market 
prices 
locally high demand for staple 
food 
Labor 
Competition with rain-fed 
system in normal and rainy 
years 
Competition with flood 
recession crop more or 
less 
Limited competition with rain-
fed or flood recession crop 
unless rainy season is early 
 
 
4.2. Poverty and equity at village level 
4.2.1. Characterization of poverty at village level  
Leaders used the number of people in the household, the number of cattle heads and the 
existence of migration remittance or regular income such as small shops or other remunerated 
activities (bread making etc) to determine wealth groups. But a factorial analysis underlined 
that other variable were associated with wealth determination notably tillage equipment, 
poultry or small animal (goats, sheep, and pigs), the quality of housing (assessed through a 
score depending of the existence tin roof, electricity panels, cemented wall and/or floor, 
latrines) (Table 6).  
Significant differences existed between the poorer groups (Groups 1 and 2) and wealthier 
groups (Groups 3 and 4) concerning household workforce, poultry and heads of cattle (Table 
4). Other variables were not significantly different or their difference could not be 
quantitatively explored as they were qualitative (housing score for example or cash income 
from other activities) or with an uncertain estimation (area cropped).   
 
TABLE 7: QUANTITATIVE VARIABLES WITH SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN WEALTH GROUPS IN 
THE VILLAGES STUDIED IN MABALANE 
 
Group 1 
Poorest 
Group 2 
Poor 
Group 3 
Middle 
Group 4 
Better off 
Size of family 6,8 b 7,4 b 12,1 a 11,3 a 
Workforce  (> 15 y.o) 4,2 b 4,4 b 6,5 a 6,5 a 
Size of families excluding solarized children and 
chronically sick  (workforce) 
4,2 b 4,7 b 7,5 a 7,5 a 
Number of cattle heads (excluding oxen) 0,8 c 1,7 c 8,4 b 18,6 a 
Poultry heads 2,8 b 3,3 b 2,8 b 5,8 a 
(source CPWF Mabalane interviews) 
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Thus wealth as perceived by leaders was determined by the capacity of the family to cultivate 
a large area (that is availability of labor and tillage equipment), and the ability to benefit from 
non-agricultural cash income (remittance, charcoal selling, local business). Excess income if 
any is principally invested in cattle and limited housing improvement. Better-off households 
have also higher mean to take care of their animals and they experienced lower mortality rate 
and/or higher reproduction rate with evidence in poultry very sensitive to new-castle disease 
in the area and goat (FEWSNET, 2012).  
As in other part of Mozambique (Vuma, 2004) and the north Gaza province (Brouwer, 2006; 
Osbahr et al., 2008) farmers engaged in reciprocal exchanges connecting the different 
households at village level. Participation in occasional mutual exchanges (principally 
Matsimo or occasional weeding work in exchange of small gift – for example alcoholic drink 
- and Kurimela/kurimelissa,  working in other’s plot in exchange of money) tended to increase 
in the lower wealth group; 71 %  of all interviewees reported having used  occasional mutual 
exchanges but only 38 % did it on a regular basis. This concerned mostly 
Kukashela/kukashelissa that is the exchange of workday against tillage equipment the main 
way by which under-equipped household get their machamba ploughed. But the efficiency for 
the most vulnerable of these exchanges network is limited as they the least able to reciprocate 
due to their limited workforce (Brouwers, 2006). Besides the type of exchange involved 
points out to the very limited monetization of the villages which probably constraints 
monetary exchanges and wages payment.  
 
4.2.2. Perception of equity and irrigation at village level  
Contrary to technicians who prefer to favor people that are the most able to take advantage of 
the support provided -for instance households with higher resources level-, villagers globally  
favored “blanket” approaches (intervention that reaches all village households) or 
development options that benefited the community as a whole such as public services or 
equipment. There were a clear preference for school upgrading (chosen by 71 % of 
interviewees), maize grinder (46 %), small animals breeding (37%). Irrigation options were 
never prioritized except for the partnership model which has been selected twice on the 
justification of solidarity between users. Globally breeding (goat notably) or vouchers for 
agricultural inputs (around 21 % of favor) was more valued for food security mechanisms 
than irrigation. Options that minimized labor mobilization or need also received attention 
which underlies the importance of labor issues at household and village level.  
But 46 % of interviewees selected at least one of the irrigation options as one of their least 
preferred (and 6 % chose two irrigation options).  And the private irrigation system (I) was 
among the three least preferred options along with the demonstration of pit latrine (41 % of 
interviewees), the building or rehabilitation of small reservoir (39 %), and the subsidy of 
tillage equipment to one family (32 %). There were variation by village with a strong 
rejection of pit latrine and the private irrigation option in Village 3 with a higher rejection of 
the I option by upper half wealth group. Although less rejected than the private irrigators 
model the association  
Globally villagers tended to reject interventions that benefited a very small number of people 
or could be controlled by a few families as they generated envy and internal conflicts in the 
village. This included “demonstration” scheme for new technology (agricultural 
demonstration, tank cistern etc) which was perceived as a favor toward beneficiaries. They 
11 
 
stressed the importance of options or arrangement that could enhance village cohesiveness 
and trust and/or limit distrust and envy with its delete effect on village functionning.  
 
 
TABLE 8: PERCENTAGE OF INTERVIEWEES FROM EACH WEALTH GROUP HAVING SELECTED AN 
IRRIGATION OPTION IN HIS LEAST PREFERRED INTERVENTIONS  
 H (association)  
I (private irrigator 
providing 5 jobs) 
J (partnership involving  
10 farmers) 
More voted least 
preferred option  
Poorest 12 % 16 % 4 %  R, D 
Poor 16 % 26 %  16 %  R, D 
Middle 9 %  45 %  9 %  I, D 
Better Off 0 %  36 %  11 % M, I/R 
 
TABLE 9: MAIN JUSTIFICATION FOR REJECTING IRRIGATION OPTIONS 
 Option Selection % justification 
I 
Private farmer 
(15 ha, 5 jobs) 
29 % 
Very small number of  beneficiaries 
It can create conflicts due to envy because a small number of people are 
involved   
The area has elephants, if they come and it the production, the pump’ owner 
would have still to find money to pay the worker 
It benefits few people, and may generate conflust .  
H 
Association 
(20 ha, 40 
farmers) 
11 % 
Although we all work in the association, when will come the harvest the division 
will not be equal 
There may be conflict between members and not be OK  
There are already an irrigation system in the village which is not functioning I 
do not see the point (Village 3) 
 
J 
Partnership (1 
owner, 9 
partners) 
11 % 
The owner of the motopump could be witchcraft, there is a lot of envy here  
It is difficult to get 9 members (socios), thus project is not adapted  
  
 
4.1. Access mode to moto-pumps 
4.1.1. Poor farmers proportionally pulls out more from collective irrigation scheme 
than wealthier villagers   
 
As highlighted, irrigation was initially promoted as drought relief mechanism through the 
development of small scale collective schemes. NGOs often started by promoting manual 
irrigation on a food-for-work basis. Selection was based on willingness to participate and 
sometimes poverty status. Most of farmers (generally women) dropped manual irrigation 
when NGOs retrieved their support: There is no real interest in labor intensive scheme in 
these communities. But although particularly labor short, the poorest groups tended to 
maintain manual irrigation, probably because they have limited other opportunities and food 
security constraints.  
In some cases, manual irrigation schemes were upgraded with moto-pumps. NGOs now 
demand a monetary participation of the community (generally one quarter or one third of the 
price of the motor) and the development of collective irrigation have slowed down except for 
the development of 10 SSI in the buffer zone funded by AFD as part of a project supporting 
LNP communities.  
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In the 3 villages studied, 14 % of all interviewees were currently irrigating either manually or 
with a moto-pump. But the proportion varied by village (Table 10). In Village3 irrigation was 
manual. The “Poorest” group was proportionally less involved in irrigation than other groups 
(Table 11).   
 
TABLE 10: IRRIGATION IN THE SAMPLE STUDIED (N = 119) 
% of interviewees Village 1 Village 2 Village 3 Total 
Currently irrigating 8 18 13 14  
Have already practices irrigation  36 45 31  
Have never irrigated including manually  69 81 75  76 
have stopped irrigating with a motopump 22 24 0 15  
Have stopped to irrigate manyally 3 7 22 8 
 
TABLE 11: IRRIGATION IN THE SAMPLE STUDIED  (N = 119) 
 
If a majority of households had never tried irrigation, many of those who tried have pulled out. 
Thus numbers also underline that poor people were included in irrigation interventions 
although the most vulnerable were proportionally less involved. But farm households from the 
two poorest group tended to pull out more than from the two wealthy groups  (Table 11).   
For the poorest, exclusion was generally voluntary and due to the difficulty to contribute to 
fuel quota. Wealthier households tended to drop out because of coordination problems in the 
association. According to the PNL assessment (Table), the cash needed to cultivate one 
hectare of maize corresponds to the price of a couple of small animal (goats) or a small head 
of cattle for irrigated bean. Interviews underlined that cash was only available by selling 
charcoal or small animals (goats etc). Irrigation is thus only an option for the wealthier 
families that are able to derive cash on a regular basis either through charcoal production or 
migration remittance. This explains why in most associations 2 to 5 years of autonomous 
functioning only a few families (4/8) are still involved. 
4.1.2. A subsidized private irrigation which benefit mostly the better-offs 
Small-scale motorized irrigation is not an innovation per-se as local elites and Portuguese 
settlers were already using motopumps before independence in the area. But private irrigation 
development has been boosted in the last years by the LDF credit system. It supports different 
types of project (Agriculture food production, Animal breeding, Fishing, Small Industry and 
carpentry, Agro-processing business, Commerce/small business, Tourism) and in the three 
years of LDF implementation, 30 agricultural food production projects have been funded. In 
Mabalane, agricultural food production projects deal with irrigation and the amount requested 
aim to cover the cost of motopump, tubes, some fuel, seeds and sometimes fertilizer up to a 
limit of 200 000 MT (67 000 USD). Collective projects were initially encouraged but 
individual projects are now prioritized.     
 
 
 Poorest Poor Middle Better Off Total 
Currently irrigating 4  18  14 18 14 
Have already practiced irrigation   16  52  27 32   
Have never practiced irrigation including manually 84  48 73 68 76 
Have stopped practicing irrigation with motopump 12  28 5 0  15  
Have stopped practicing irrigation manually  4  8 9 14 8 
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TABLE 12 : AGRICULTURAL FOOD PRODUCTION PROJECTS FUNDED BY LDF IN MABALANE 
 2011 2012 2013 
Nb irrigation project funded 16* 3 11 
Total number  of projects 65* 42 34 
 *partial data :  1 AP out of 3 is missing 
 
Although there is an increasing pressure to reimburse, the main issue of the LFD in Mabalane 
– as in all Mozambique - remained its limited reimbursement rate. In 2013, the cumulative 
payment between 2007/2010 corresponding to the first round of projects of 18.894.140,00 MT 
amounted to only 968 407 MT or 5,1 % of the sum due (including interests). Thus the LFD 
scheme has been basically subsidizing projects.  
The LCC are in charge of assessing project promoter’s trustworthiness but there is no formal 
assessment of the quality of the project. Project submission is simple and although a request 
form is available, a letter explaining the type of project and the total amount requested is 
sufficient. There seem to be little competition locally between projects except in the main 
vilas: the most rural AP even reported difficulty to fully allocate his share which is being 
reverted to district level which concentrates the larger number of civil servants and elites. 
Indeed as underlined by an independent anticorruption organization district elites such as 
business people and public servants are the one that benefit the most of the scheme in 
Mabalane as in other district (CIP, 2009; CIP and LMDH, 2011, 2012). Besides allocations 
reports also showed that most local beneficiaries came from the same few communities. In 
our sample only one household mentioned having beneficiated from LDF funding (for small 
business).  
Many poor farmers claimed to be reluctant to engage in a credit scheme due to the many risks 
involved in rural activities that could derailed even the most trustworthy and hardworking 
beneficiary. But the bias toward local elites and civil servants can be mainly traced to LCC 
functioning: as participants are coopted LCC were controlled by the administration, the 
dominating political members and elites. In this sense Mabalane LCC functioning is not 
surprisingly different from other districts (Forquilha and Orre, 2011; Lagrosse, 2012).  
 
4.1.1. The development of private SSI is affecting collective irrigation  
In Mozambique, land is globally not restricted and labour shortage is more limiting than land. 
But in the area finding a suitable site for irrigation that minimizes irrigation costs and labour 
for construction can be challenging: the land closest to the river are also the most fertile areas. 
Permanent access to water in the river is limited to the remaining pools in the river bed and 
because these areas are the most fertile and interesting they have long been occupied and 
appropriated by powerful members of the communities.   
As most countries in Southern Africa Mozambique is characterized by the existence of a dual 
system of customary and statutory land tenure. Smallholders and communities rely on 
customary tenure regimes where the traditional chief allocates land to families. This land can 
be inherited. In the family sector and community security of tenure is guarantee by occupation.  
But users may further protect their land right by getting a formal right to use and exploit the 
land (DUAT – Direito de Uso e Aproveitamento da Terra) which can be attributed to 
individual or community. Private investors usually use this statutory system to get access to 
land which includes the negotiation of compensation to the community (Tique, 2002a).  
At village level there are two main ways of securing land suitable for collective scheme: (i) 
the plot of an absentee landowner (e.g for example having migrating in South Africa) is 
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attributed by the leaders (ii) negotiation with the landowner, which may include specific 
entitlements in land share in the scheme. This is however not systematic as irrigation 
developed by an association with a food security objective can be perceived as a collective 
activity contributing to the development of the village. In this case, the negotiation is 
generally mediated by the leader and the landowner may accept to let the association use his 
land without any conditions attached. In two villages of the district however land conflict or 
negotiation failure had blocked the development of a collective irrigation scheme supported 
by external intervention.  
These are unstable land tenure arrangements which can be submitted to renegotiation. Various 
case of moving the location of collective scheme has been reported during focus groups. 
Competition on irrigable land have increased with the development of LDF subsidies: 
Changes in village leadership or district government district and consequence changes of 
power networks offers the opportunity for the landowner to claim back his land and develop 
his own individual irrigation system.  
In one case one association had to move because of a large area of land was allocated to 
commercial farming by the government. Indeed the land attribution mechanism state than the 
private investor has to compensate the community, generally in the form of investment in the 
village (building or equipment of school, hospital).  In both villages where such compensation 
had been negotiated, the communities were still waiting for the commitment to be fulfilled a 
couple of years after the investor had started his operation. These difficulties concerning the 
relationships between private investors and community are not rare (Tique, 2002b).   
5. Discussion - conclusion 
LDF credit system is in practice subsidizing private irrigation. Due to the mechanism of 
allocation these subsidies are mostly benefitting district elites, although their economic 
viability in the local context characterized by high inputs cost and confined market remains to 
be assessed.  
There are little opportunities for indirect impact of SSI in the area. It remains to be assessed 
whether the development of SSI on a larger scale could significantly contribute to jobs 
generation. Locally only well managed private irrigation system of more than 15/20 ha 
mentioned external recruitments with a limited number of beneficiaries (3/4). In area where 
the labor market is inexistent, irrigation can fail to contribute to jobs and wage (Van Den Berg 
and Ruben, 2006). While 8000 ha are being irrigated in the close Chókwè district there is no 
real organized labor market although local farmers are reporting labor shortage during the 
peak period of implantation and harvest, probably because wages opportunities and value are 
not sufficiently attractive or regular to compete with better opportunities (for example 
migration to South Africa): Interestingly South African small motopump owners of the other 
side of the Kruger Park (which extend the LNP on the South African Park) mentioned 
recruiting (illegal) Mozambican shangaana farmers during harvest time, probably coming 
from the Limpopo Basin districts. 
The economic and technical performance of the scheme are further impacted by coordination 
issues which is also reported as a reason for pulling out irrigation. Coordination issues that are 
organization between members to share water and maintenance have rarely if ever being 
tackled or even considered by project intervention. There are all the more important that there 
have been only rare previous experiences of collective work, and a tradition of top down 
functioning. External intervention often assumes than collective action capacity is an intrinsic 
quality of community. But In Southern Africa collective action revolved more around the 
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quality of local leadership and autonomous self-help group or association are rare (Cammack, 
2012).  
Dillon (2011) points out the role of small scale irrigation in traditional solidarity system in 
Mabalane. Indeed in Mabalane better-offs farmers occasionally invited poorer households to 
join and irrigate during a drought.  But only a very small number of households were included 
and specific conditions concerning sharing cost and workforce were often attached. Mutual 
aid groups play a key role during extreme events (Brouwers 2006) but these arrangements are 
very fragile and limited in time,  social extend and impact (Eriksen and Silva, 2009; Brouwers, 
2006) 
The development of subsidies for irrigation through the LFD funds is also contributing to 
changing the status of irrigable land from a public good (for collective food production during 
the hungry gap period) to an economic resource (income-generating activities). In many 
villages the development of small scale irrigation is thus accompanied by the renegotiations of 
land tenure arrangement which benefited associations further jeopardizing their functioning. 
Irrigation project are perceived are not really equitable. Individual irrigation is actually one of 
the most rejected interventions. In these communities, badly implemented previous external 
intervention have pervasive cumulative effect on community cohesiveness and trust (Ducrot 
2014) as in forest management in Malawi (Kamoto et al., 2013). Collective action capacity is 
required in many natural resources management activities which are at the heart of local 
livelihoods, including vital domestic water supply and forest management. The development 
of private irrigation through the hidden subsidies of the LFD mechanism is thus a potential 
threat to the social capital of the community and natural resources management.  
It is now well acknowledged that irrigation, inclusively small scale irrigation is contributing 
to poverty alleviation. In the local context studied characterized by difficulties of access, 
confined market, labour and cash shortage, there is strong indication that poverty alleviation 
mechanism based on small scale irrigation is missing the target. Indeed packaging irrigation 
development with other measure (credit, market, education and training etc) would help to lift 
some of the local constraints (Namara et al., 2013). But this work also underlines that it 
should be accompanied to targeted measure to the poorest such as safety nets. Some 
interventions are locally being experimented by INAS which plans to expand it direct targeted 
subsidy program for the most vulnerable in all villages of the district. Other argues than a 
universal blanket subsidy for aged people or children would not only alleviate poverty but 
increase village monitarization and thus economic development opportunities at village and 
district level (Hanlon, 2009).  
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